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Abstract: 
 
Since the 1990s, the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Security Service (MI5) have 
developed formal links with most major UK news organizations in an effort to improve the 
agencies’ media presentation. This paper discusses the impact and inherent problems of 
these relationships, including whether the news media can have official, formal but non-
attributable links with these agencies without compromising their role as the fourth estate.  
 
Utilizing epistemologies for crime reporting and news sources, this paper proposes an 
initial framework to analyze these institutional relationships. It also takes as a case study 
the controversy over whether the MI5 deliberately played down their prior knowledge of 
7/7 suicide bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan. The author was one of the journalists 
briefed by MI5 on Khan and has here take the Khan controversy as a case study to 
investigate the Security Services’ information flow and whether the agency misled, and 
indeed intended to mislead, the media and the public.  
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Introduction 
 
The appropriate and effective function of the intelligence services is crucial for the maintenance 
of democracy. History teaches us that these agencies are prone to mission creep into the political 
realm and thus they need the independent scrutiny of the fourth estate. (Carlyle, 1841) The 
media also need information about the operational aspects of these agencies to fulfill their 
primary duty to their public of accurate and insightful reporting. 
 
‘Despite the prolific press coverage of the intelligence services since 9/11, the interaction of this 
secret realm of government with the media has received little sustained analysis,’ Professor 
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Richard Aldrich observed in Spinning Intelligence, the 2009 edited collection that went some 
way to correct this deficit.   
 
The Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) are key elements in the 
intelligence network that includes the eavesdropping agency GCHQ and also groupings such as 
the Joint Intelligence Committee which provide overall analysis and assessments. Neither MI5 
nor MI6 have press offices. GCHQ does have a press office but it does not discuss intelligence 
matters only community and administrative issues. The author has been an investigative 
journalist in the UK national media for three decades with specialist knowledge of intelligence. 
While working for Independent Newspapers he dealt with intelligence agencies up to 2008, 
including the controversial ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 7/7 and ‘extraordinary rendition’ 
briefings.  This paper focusses on the institutional relationship between MI5 and MI6 and the 
major news media. It begins by providing a historical account of the institutional relations 
between UK intelligence agencies and the media.  It then examines the formal if disguised 
relationships that have been developed since the 1990s by MI6 and MI5 with major news 
organisations in an effort to improve media relations. Using these formal but disguised links with 
the mainstream media the intelligence services incorrectly briefed there were WMD in Iraq as 
late as four weeks after the 2003 invasion. In terms of this paper two key questions arise from the 
WMD controversy:  
Do these links serve the public interest?  
Can there be trust between the intelligence services and the media?  
 
Certainly the media failed in their fourth estate role to effectively interrogate the intelligence 
based assessments of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction in both the UK and the US. It is now 
commonly accepted that the Western allies went to war in Iraq on a false premise as a result of 
the manipulation and exaggeration of intelligence data. MI6’s role in the WMD controversy 
raised serious fourth estate issues. Unfortunately WMD is a difficult example to use as a case 
study for reasons outlined below. To examine these issues the author has chosen as a case study 
the controversy over whether the Security Service (MI5) deliberately played down their prior 
knowledge of 7/7 suicide bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan. This case study lends itself to audit. 
 
Building a framework 
 
The existence of formal links between intelligence organisations and the media places an 
imperative on finding a theoretical framework to analyse the consequences of these institutional 
relationships. In the absence of a suitable or comparable framework within intelligence 
epistemology this papers turns to media theory. The opaque nature of the intelligence services 
makes it difficult for the media to exercise an informed and coherent critique of the performance 
of the intelligence agencies. Christopher Andrew has pointed out: “The ‘under-theorisation’ of 
intelligence studies is not simply a problem for academic research. It also degrades much public 
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discussion of the role of intelligence. Since September 11, 2001, the media and even some 
learned journals have been full of claims of ‘intelligence failure’. But the majority of those who 
use the phrase seem to have no coherent idea of what it means. Clearly, a lack of a 100 per cent 
success rate does not constitute failure.” (Andrew, 2004, 181) Andrew is right as most of the 
news media are stuck in a “success” or “failure” binary that does not serve their audience well. 
 
Since the 1970s theorists have sought to build a framework for the discussion of news processes. 
A detailed critique of crime reporting has been central to this framework. It was also one of the 
first areas to consider the impact of news sources, focussing on the ability of the police to set the 
news agenda. This discourse can be seen as useful template to begin to discuss intelligence 
sources, not least as there are similarities between the police and intelligence agencies as 
institutions. In the 1970s social scientists from the ‘Deviance’ school formulated important 
theory on the nature of the news media. In their seminal study on the construction of the offence 
of ‘mugging’ in 1978 Stuart Hall et al expanded on what Becker (1972) had called the ‘hierarchy 
of credibility’ and suggest ‘the likelihood that those in powerful or high status positions who 
offer opinions about controversial topic will have their definitions accepted, because such 
spokesmen are understood to have access to more accurate or specialised information on 
particular topics than the majority of the population. The result of this structured preference is 
that these spokesmen’ become what we call primary definers of topics.’ (Hall et al, 1978, 58) 
Hall et al argued that the media direct the debate by giving voice to the primary definers; who 
then set the limit for all subsequent discussions of the topic. ‘This initial framework then 
provides criteria by which all subsequent contributions are labelled as “relevant” to the debate or 
“irrelevant” – beside the point. Contributions which stray from this framework are exposed to the 
charge that they are “not addressing the problem.” (Hall et al, 1978, 59)  The importance of this 
work was that Hall et al were able to show how the news agenda could be manipulated. 
 
Other theorists complemented Hall et al’s work, including Chibnall’s work on crime reporting, 
contribution to the second edition of The Manufacture of News and in Law and Order News. This 
also suggested that the police could act as primary definers, setting the agenda for the way the 
crime was reported and thus perceived. Over the intervening years more subtle theory has 
evolved from this work critiquing the hegemonic aspect of Hall et al analysis. Schlesinger and 
Tumber gave a more nuanced take on primary definers. (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994, 17-21). 
Simon Cottle was critical of shortcomings but observed Hall et al’s early work had the advantage 
of  “identifying the structural and institutional linkages between the mass media and other 
centres of power – linkages that can be examined and that promise to help explain the 
‘hierarchies of credibility’ and the differential opportunities of media access granted by the mass 
media to contesting…voices and interests” (Cottle, 1998, 18) 
 
The intelligence services are perhaps the most difficult institutions of state for the news media to 
exercise the role of the fourth estate by dint of those organizations’ inherent penchant for 
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secrecy. Unlike crime reporting, the information flow takes place almost entirely outside of the 
public sphere and is not attributed. The importance of the fourth estate task is reflected in that the 
intelligence services, Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Security Service (MI5), have 
historically been proven to have directly and covertly intervened in the democratic process not 
only abroad but in the UK, sometimes at the behest of government and sometimes not.  Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson was convinced that MI5 was undermining his Labour Government and 
was even concerned that senior intelligent officials were planning a right wing coup (Leigh, 
1988) (Wright, 1987) (Cudlipp, 1976, 326) (Ramsay and Dorril, 1992). So how can journalists 
monitor the activities of intelligence agencies to ensure they act in the best interests of liberal 
democracy? There has to be some form of contact but not so that the media become mere 
mouthpieces for the intelligence services. 
 
The history of intelligence agency links to the media 
 
Prior to the 1990s in terms of their remits MI5 and MI6 should have had no official interest in 
entering the public sphere. However, while Britain’s intelligence and security entities have been 
cloaked by secrecy and anonymity, they have a long history of ‘under the table’ informal links 
with journalists. These controversial links go back to the early days of the modern intelligence 
services. Many senior national media journalists, especially in the first half of the 20
th
 Century, 
had worked in intelligence at some point in their careers, often during wartime. Phillip Knightley 
noted "many journalists thought they could best help defeat Hitler by writing propaganda for one 
of the information offices or by serving in one of the secret services" (Knightley, 2006, 7) 
Access to inside information from within the intelligence services was and is a career enhancing 
facility for journalists. The covert flow of intelligence information to selected journalists reached 
its peak in the decades after the Second World War. As the diplomatic relationships between the 
West and the Communist bloc froze, the Foreign Office's Information Research Department 
(IRD) was launched under the Labour Government in 1948 and clandestinely financed from the 
Secret Intelligence Service budget.  A large organisation with close links to MI6 (with whom it 
shared personnel), IRD waged a vigorous covert propaganda campaign against Communism for 
nearly thirty years supplying carefully selected journalists, politicians, academics and trade 
unionists with intelligence data. (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, cover) IRD’s work was officially 
sanctioned and a key part of its role was to create a cordon sanitaire so that government inspired 
information was placed in the public sphere but without attribution.   
 
Urinal or conduit? 
 
Having worked in defence during the Second World War, Chapman Pincher was the first 
journalist to cover the world of spying in depth, mostly for the Daily Express. Pincher’s 
journalism has always been controversial. He was the target of historian E.P.Thompson’s famous 
caustic observation that, Chapman was ‘the urinal where Ministers and officials queued up to 
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leak to’. It is a remark in which Pincher takes perverse pride. In 2009, he wrote: ‘It is satisfying, 
at the age of 94, to look back on a career in investigative reporting spanning more than sixty 
years – in various media – and to know that I would choose to repeat it in preference to any other 
profession.’(Dover and Goodman, 2009, 149). The urinal remark points to the problems facing 
of journalists of maintaining high quality sources while remaining independent. 
 
Wherever British intelligence and security services have operated there are issues over selected 
leaking and disinformation. Northern Ireland was infamous as documented by Curtis (1984), 
Bloch and Fitzgerald (1979) and Miller (1994).
 
 We get occasion glimpses of deliberate 
intelligence leaks into the public sphere through trusted journalists. In the late 1990s The Sunday 
Telegraph alleged the son of the then Libyan Leader Colonel Gaddafi was involved in a criminal 
enterprise with Iranian officials that involved counterfeit notes and money laundering in Europe. 
This backfired as the Sunday Telegraph could not evidence the allegations and the resultant libel 
action ended up with the paper paying damages. The story was written by Con Coughlin, the 
paper's then chief foreign correspondent, and it was attributed to a ‘British banking official’. It 
emerged in the trial that in fact, it had been given to him by MI6 officials. (Leigh, 2000). This 
appears to have been an officially sanctioned informal leak. 
 
Investigative Journalism 
 
Post-WW2, the national security consensus began to break down with the emergence of societal 
change, scepticism and a non-compliant breed of journalists.  At that time, except for the chosen, 
the working journalist had no direct access to the agencies that were not officially acknowledged 
to exist by Government. Questions were directed to designated Home Office or Foreign Office 
press officers who usually were, I can vouch, at best, evasive. (The CIA and FBI have both had 
Public Affairs office for decades although this does not automatically improve relationship with 
the media.) A wave of media investigations into the CIA and other American agencies from the 
late 1960s revealed wholesale range of illegal, anti-democratic activity and paralyzing internal 
bickering was exposed. The same happened in the UK where extensive illegal and politically 
partisan action by the intelligence services was gradually revealed. British intelligence was 
revealed to have been involved in many coups from Iraq to Indonesia, often with unintended and 
unfortunate consequences. (Lashmar and Oliver, 1998, 1-10)  It was the new breed of journalists 
who manifestly exercised the fourth estate role and the scrutiny was much needed. During the 
Cold War MI5 had applied questionable methods against those they perceived to be on the left 
and it had trouble distinguish the currents of the New Left from the pre-war old school sympathy 
for communism. MI5 systematically and secretly blacklisted many people applying for jobs in 
the BBC, sometimes on the basis of inaccurate information. A ‘christmas tree’ marker was 
placed on the files of such suspect applicants. (Leigh and Lashmar, 1985)  Here we find MI5 
covertly denying the rights of other to enter the public sphere. The publication of Spycatcher, by 
the former senior MI5 officer Peter Wright, despite British Government legal action, revealed 
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MI5 to be a department riven by internal factions (Wright, 1987). The book was published in 
Australia to defeat a ban and lengthy legal action by the UK government. 
 
Professor Richard Keeble examined a wide range of claims of inappropriate relationships 
between intelligence agencies and journalists. He concluded: ‘Thus from this evidence alone it is 
clear there has been a long history of links between hacks and spooks. But as the secret state 
grows in power, through massive resourcing, through a whole raft of legislation — such as the 
Official Secrets Act, the anti-terrorism legislation, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
and so on — and as intelligence moves into the heart of ex-British leader Tony Blair and prime 
minister Gordon Brown's ruling clique so these links are even more significant.’(Keeble, 2008) 
 
Partial Glasnost 
 
Post-Cold War there was growing pressure for Freedom of Information, transparency and 
accountability in Whitehall. Sometime at the beginning of the 1990s, MI6, supported by the then 
Prime Minister John Major, decided the time had come for the agencies to develop more formal 
(if still anonymous and opaque) relationships with some major media organisations.  The old 
wartime ‘old boy’s network’ relationships had faded (though they had not totally disappeared) 
and were to be replaced with a modern make-over. (Whether this was a modernisation or a 
response to a reduced ability to access the public sphere to influence debate, or part of the effort 
to find a post-Cold War role is not yet clear.) As a trial, MI6 was prepared to talk to one link 
reporter in a small number of major UK media organisations. David Rose, then home affairs 
editor of The Observer has described the process. He was proposed as intermediary between the 
paper and MI6 by the then editor, Donald Trelford.  In May 1992, over lunch his new MI6 
contact (who he gives the pseudonym Tom Bourgeois) told Rose that MI6 ‘had always had a 
few, very limited contacts with journalists and editors, it now felt the need to put these 
arrangements on a broader and more formal basis.’(Rose, 2007). 
 
Our conversations would not merely be off-the-record, and hence attributable in print to 
an unnamed MI6 official. In public I would have to pretend they had never happened, and 
if I wanted to quote or paraphrase anything Bourgeois said, I would have to use a 
circumlocution so vague as to make it impossible for any reader to realize that I had 
spoken to someone from the Office at all. Should I breach these conditions, Bourgeois 
made clear, I could expect instant outer darkness: the refusal of all future access. 
 
What we see here is gear change in the institutional relationship, as it is official, acknowledged 
by both sides, but not attributable. David Rose says he had had stories leaked to him by MI6. So 
the intelligence services were keen to take the opportunity to be proactive primary definers in the 
public sphere and on occasion shape the news agenda. 
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Accredited journalists 
 
Over the 1990s, the experiment was deemed a success and extended to a wider range of news 
organisations. Expanding the franchise though, meant the ‘rules of engagement’ were to become 
tighter. Under the new arrangements the agencies were not to ‘plant’ stories, at least not to the 
new intake of accredited journalists. So in exchange for a wider set of institutional links the 
agencies were prepared to become passive primary definers responding to stories but able to 
retain some control over their shape. Later, the Intelligence Select Committee Report for 2004-5 
described the arrangement publicly:  
‘Currently, a number of media outlets have a journalist ‘accredited’ to the Security 
Service and/or the SIS; these journalists are able to contact the Services for guidance. In 
turn, they are briefed by the Security Service or the SIS about matters relevant to the 
Services. The agreement between the Agencies and journalists is that all these contacts 
are off-the-record and must not be quoted directly…… Both the Security Service and the 
SIS told us that they deal only with journalists who have a reputation for discretion and 
professionalism.’  
 
In addition the intelligence agencies instigated a policy whereby the heads of the agencies would 
speak publicly from time to time providing an overview of the work their agencies undertook 
and the level of threat. Through this we can see the intelligence agencies seeking to be primary 
definers and set parts of the debate. Public speaking by the heads of agencies is used sparingly 
usually at a major event or committee hearing but it falls entirely within Hall et al’s concept of a 
primary definer.  
 
My own experience as an accredited reporter with the intelligence services began, some years 
after David Rose, while working for  Independent Newspapers. Intelligence and terrorism was 
part of my beat and the approach was direct. The first meeting with the MI5 link man was in a 
restaurant amusingly called ‘KGB’ in Central London.  Further meetings occurred about every 
six months to a year. Meanwhile there were many phone calls, especially when terrorism was in 
the news. The terms were very similar to those spelt out to David Rose. There would be no direct 
quotes attributable to MI5 instead the sources would be much vaguer usually ‘a Whitehall 
source’. MI5 were not keen on the phrase ‘a security source’.  
 
There are the ever present dangers in the relationship between journalists and their sources 
especially when sources want to protect their anonymity. (Franklin and Carlson, 2011)  In 2002 
Martin Bright, who was then Home Affairs Editor of The Observer and the link to MI5 wrote a 
critical article on the accredited journalist relationship. ‘Most journalists agree that this is less 
compromising than the old system, but it is far from ideal,’ he said. 
‘Most journalists feel that, on balance, it is better to report what the intelligence services are 
saying, but whenever the readers see the words “Whitehall sources” they should have no 
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illusions about where the information comes from. In the period immediately following the 
events of September 11 and up to the new internment legislation, these journalistic briefings 
were used to prepare journalists for what was to come.’ (Bright, 2002) It is worth quoting the 
Bright article at some length as it demonstrates the problems the anonymity brings: 
 
… it is easy to spot where other such briefings have occurred, but I will give just one 
example. I have chosen it because of the impeccable reputation of the journalists 
concerned. It is from an article entitled 'MI5 searches for terror cells based in Britain' by 
Paul Lashmar and Chris Blackhurst in The Independent on 16 September 2001, less than 
a week after the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Lashmar and 
Blackhurst are two of our most respected investigative journalists and were, at the time, 
in charge of investigations for The Independent.  
The article shows that even journalists as experienced as they are were forced to fall back 
on intelligence sources when assessing the Islamist threat in Britain. They report that at 
least three terrorist cells linked to Bin Laden are at large in Britain and that the UK has 
been a major base for Bin Laden's operations. They add that there are believed to be 
dozens of terrorists in Britain associated with Bin Laden.  
One 'intelligence source' is then quoted as saying 'There is no reason why what happened 
in America couldn't happen in Britain or any European country. The terrorists are in 
place, and there is very little to stop them.' A source, this time from 'Whitehall' adds: 'The 
problem is, these groups are amorphous and hard to identify until the they commit a 
terrorist act.' This is terrifying stuff and the two journalists concerned were right to report 
what was said to them - indeed, it is hard to imagine anything that was more in the public 
interest. But it seems a little disingenuous of the intelligence services to present this as 
independent evidence of the threat, when the journalists are simply reporting what they 
have been told. It is particularly difficult when it would appear that they contradict 
themselves when talking to other journalists. 
Although it was not his intention, Bright reveals a problem caused by the agencies’ attribution 
rules. The ‘intelligence source’ was not an official source and a personal contact that had 
previously provided me with material that was often critical of MI5 actions. (It was the same 
source that later warned me about the ‘sexing up’ of infamous Blair dossier see Whitaker et al, 
2003) Bright is correct about the ‘Whitehall source’ being the MI5 official link. The vague 
attribution required by the accreditation agreement did create a lack of clarity and as we shall see 
the problems this created below is discussed in more detail below. These accredited intelligence 
contacts were to prove useful post 9/11 and they enhanced the Independent on Sunday’s (I had 
changed newspapers by 9/11) coverage of the War on Terror. The Independent on Sunday team 
found that information from these contacts was measured and sensible. The MI5 liaison officials 
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were scrupulous in maintaining the rules that had been first set out. At no time was a story 
offered by these sources.  
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
As the War on Terror progressed, serious questions arose about the veracity of intelligence based 
information released by government. Former senior intelligence official John Morrison has said 
that the Blair/Campbell school of media manipulation infected the agencies: ‘‘There was a 
culture news management which came in after 1997 which I had not seen before, and 
intelligence got swept up in that.’’(Norton-Taylor and White, 2004) For the journalist access to 
high level sources is a great resource but it can be hard to resist the danger of ‘going native’. 
Using the Hall et al model one can see that not only No10, MI6 and others sought to be the 
primary definers of the Iraq story and too often journalists obliged uncritically. One, David Rose, 
later wrote a mea culpa article for the News Statesman in 2007 admitting he had got too close to 
his intelligence contacts. 
To my everlasting regret, I strongly supported the Iraq invasion, in person and in print. I 
had become a recipient of what we now know to have been sheer disinformation about 
Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and his purported "links" with al-Qaeda - 
claims put out by Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress.  
Rose added:  
I remember one particular conversation I had with an official in the early summer of 
2003, not long before Andrew Gilligan's BBC broadcast about the government having 
"sexed up" its dossier on Iraqi WMDs in September 2002. Already it was becoming 
apparent that the threat had probably been a chimera. "Don't worry," my source said 
soothingly. "We'll find them. We're certain they're there. It's just taking longer than we 
expected. Keep your nerve." 
I too received these briefings and was consistently told with great certitude that there were WMD 
in Iraq. As late as four weeks after the invasion the press person for MI6 asserted confidently that 
they would find WMD. Unlike The Observer, the Independent on Sunday’s collective position 
was of profound scepticism over WMD. Hall et al’s words on primary definers are never more 
appropriate than with the intelligence services “such spokesmen are understood to have access to 
more accurate or specialized information on particular topics than the majority of the 
population.” At the same time I was also dealing with non-official, long-standing contacts within 
the intelligence agencies. Talking to these unsanctioned contacts was difficult as the journalist 
must protect their sources and that’s pretty tough when it comes to dealing with the spy world. It 
became very difficult around the time of the Kelly affair after the then Home Secretary John 
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Reid lambasted unofficial sources as a ‘rogue element’ on the BBC’s Today Programme 
specifically referring to my sources.  
‘……I said a rogue element because I thought there was one that was briefing Andrew Gilligan 
or indeed I said indeed elements because there may be the same source, there may be the same 
person, who is briefing the Independent on Sunday and various others, I don't know. But they are 
very much in the minority.’(Today, 2003)  
The picture the insiders had given was different in key ways from the official line and helped 
produce much more nuanced journalism. As they were widely recognized as having entered the 
public sphere the intelligence agencies were now caught in the political crossfire. This raises the 
question is whether intelligence agencies can have formal links with the news media without 
risking the clandestine operating environment in which they need to protect national security? 
Two intelligence academics, Professor Anthony Glees and Dr Philip H. J. Davies argued in that 
the “….controversies over Iraq Intelligence are a direct result of John Major's Open Government 
Initiative – when the intelligence services are brought into the open they are inevitably 
politicised. They argued that the intelligence services should return to anonymity. (Glees and 
Davies, 2004) 
 
A culture of selective leaking 
 
An initial framework can be constructed to chart the institutional relationship can be structured in 
terms of the intelligence agencies entry into the public sphere and whether, when they seek to do 
so, it is on firstly, on an official or unofficial basis and secondly, whether it on an informal or 
formal basis. Information release into the public sphere by intelligence agencies seems to have 
several basic forms prior to the 1990s.  
 
 Officially sanctioned but non-attributable information released to selected reporters from 
a major news organisation. 
 
 Officially sanctioned exclusive leak to a selected reporter from a major news 
organisation. 
 
 Information leaked by a senior official to a selected reporter from a major news 
organization without internal recrimination. 
 
 Information leaked by an official to a selected reporter from a major news organization 
with possible internal recrimination. 
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 Guidance on a specific story to a selected reporter from a major news organization 
informally by an official. 
 
After 1990s we can add: 
 
 Formal officially sanctioned but non attributable information released to all major news 
organisations. 
 
 Formal guidance on a specific story to a selected reporter from a major news organization 
informally. 
 
Outside the institutional information flow there have examples through the years from informal 
flow from, current or former, officials providing whistleblowing, dissident or alternative 
viewpoints. Peter Wright would be an example of a dissident former official entering the public 
sphere unsanctioned.  
 
 
CASE STUDY: Mohamed Sidique Khan 
 
Can the intelligence agencies be trusted to ever provide accurate information though the 
accredited journalism system? Surprisingly, this question has not been subject to any previous 
forensic analysis. Certainly the question is raised by the briefings on WMD but that controversy 
is not an ideal test case. The source of information in the build-up to the Iraq invasion tends to be 
so opaque and have such an international and broad political range of sources it is quite hard to 
tie down exactly what part MI6 played in supplying misinformation. It is hard to remove external 
political input from the equation. There are then several possible other case studies including the 
UK intelligence agencies knowledge and involvement in the United States’ euphemistically 
named ‘extraordinary rendition’ operations. This paper examines the vexed issue of MI5’s prior 
knowledge of 7/7 bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan to test the reliability of the intelligence 
services press briefings as it is possible to track key parts of the information flow. Input from 
politicians, MI6, or United States sources can be eliminated and so more readily can be seen as a 
litmus test of trust, at least with MI5.  
 
Khan was the eldest of the four suicide bombers responsible for the 7 July 2005 London 
bombings, in which bombs were detonated on three London Underground trains and one bus in 
central London suicide attacks, killing 52 people excluding the attackers and injured over 700 
people. It took the security services and police a few days to positively identify Khan and the 
other bombers. It was not until 12 July that they were certain it was Khan. The issue of trust 
revolves round whether Khan was previously known and identified by security forces and 
whether MI5 deliberately withheld and lied about that knowledge. As has been seen, David 
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Rose’s accuses MI5 of identifying the four bombers as ‘clean skins’ - unknown to the police. 
We, at the Independent on Sunday, became troubled by this issue as it became clear that MI5 had 
given us inaccurate information and that Khan had previously been under surveillance by the 
security forces. We had said that the bombers were unknown in the immediate aftermath and 
then reported as connections emerged. We were concerned that MI5 had deliberately misled us 
and this following research is partly motivated by the desire to resolve the issue. It certainly 
made us more wary of information passed through the accredited journalist system 
 
David Rose’s anger at being, what he believed were deliberate lies, is palpable in his mea culpa. 
After berating US sources for misleading journalists he moves on to the UK Security Service. 
More recent media briefings seem equally questionable. After the 7 July 2005 London 
bombings, MI5 told its stable of reporters that the bombers had all been ‘clean skins’ who 
had been completely unknown to them; later they said there appeared to be ‘no 
connection’ between the 7/7 cell and the failed 21/7 group who tried to repeat the 
atrocities a fortnight later. Only two years later, thanks to evidence given in criminal 
trials, did it become clear that both claims were false. In fact, the two leaders of the 7/7 
gang, Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shazad Tanweer, had been observed by MI5 
surveillance officers at least four times, and were known to be connected to another, now 
convicted, terrorist cell. But MI5 had decided to leave them alone while both men had 
apparently trained in Pakistan, at the same time as the 21/7 group. (Rose, 2007) 
 
Within months of the suicide bombings there was a wide perception that MI5 had covered up its 
extensive prior knowledge of Khan to disguise the agency’s incompetence, The Intelligence and 
Security Committee produced a report on in May 2006 into the 7/7 and 21/7 bomb plots. One of 
the Report’s findings was that MI5 had come across two of the 7/7 bombers on the edge of other 
investigations. It said: ‘A review of related surveillance data showed that Siddeque KHAN and 
Shazad TANWEER had been among a group of men who had held meetings with others under 
Security Service investigation in 2004.’ These ‘others’ were the Operation Crevice group, a 
different bomb plot in which a number of people were arrested and later tried.(ISC, 2005) Since 
May 2006 more and more links emerged public demands for inquiry grew. Khan had been 
spotted by security forces with those later arrested for Crevice. Such was the public outcry that 
the Intelligence and Security Committee reinvestigated the issue and published a new detailed 
report in May 2009 (ISC, 2009). It is now certain UK security services had many more leads on 
Khan than they admitted non-attributably in 2005. The report revealed that Khan was under 
covert surveillance by the security services ten times before the launch of the attacks. (ISC, 
2009). As late as May 2010 it emerged that fingerprints of Khan could have been on police 
records 19 years before the attacks 
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The crux of the allegations we are concerned with here is that, in the immediate aftermath of the 
bombings, MI5 claimed the bombers were ‘clean skins’, i.e. not previously known to the 
Security Services. The Nexis electronic newspaper archive suggests the first published reference 
to ‘clean skins’ in this context come on 13th July. The Birmingham Post reported: ‘The security 
services were last night coming to terms with the nightmare scenario that the London bombers 
were ordinary citizens who had never come to the attention of the authorities. A senior security 
source said the existence of so-called 'clean skins' made the job of preventing further attacks 
even more difficult.  
“How many clean skins have we got waiting in the wings?” he asked.’ 
 
The Belfast Telegraph ran an almost identically worded story. The repetition of the exact phrase 
suggests both papers used a Press Association (PA) News Agency report and sure enough there 
is a PA report on 12th July by Nick Allen and Neville Dean: ‘Detectives and the security 
services fear there could still be a second suicide bomb team waiting to strike and that an al 
Qaida mastermind could have orchestrated the attacks before fleeing the UK. 
The bombers appear to be the security services' worst nightmare, so-called ‘clean skins’, 
apparently ordinary young men who had not previously come to the attention of the authorities. 
‘How many clean skins have we got waiting in the wings?’ a senior security source said. 
‘What we don't know is whether someone came in under the al Qaida methodology, whether 
they came in, did the preparation and left the country the day before the attacks.’  
 
This report has been at the centre of allegations that MI5 misled the media and the public. One of 
the bylined reporters, Nick Allen, says of the quote from a ‘security source’: ‘I'm afraid that 
definitely didn't come from the MI5 spokesman as I wasn't the accredited PA person and have 
never spoken to them. We would have picked it up from briefings at Scotland Yard. Confusingly, 
the anti-terrorist police often got referred to as ‘security sources’ at the time. From memory I 
think the phrase ‘clean skins’ was already in use in the US media and was being bandied around 
by journalists and police officers here.’ (Nick Allen was at the time of writing The Daily 
Telegraph’s U.S. Entertainment Correspondent based in Los Angeles) (Email correspondence 
with author 7
 
 Oct 2010.)
 
 
The ISC report says; ‘MI5 did not call the bombers ‘clean skins’. This phrase is not one that 
MI5 use and they did not use it in relation to the bombers. MI5 have told the Committee that 
the phrase they used with the media was ‘not on our radar’, which was an accurate reflection 
of what they knew in the days immediately following the attacks. The Committee has also 
reviewed the Metropolitan Police Service’s press releases, statements and question and 
answer material from 7 July to 10 July 2005 and can find no mention of the phrase ‘clean 
skins’.  
As the ISC says, the key question being asked was: ‘If MI5 had come across Mohammed Sidique 
KHAN and Shazad TANWEER before, why didn’t they prevent this outrage?’ The ISC deal 
14 | P a g e  
 
with this issue head on. ‘Even though Sidique/Sidique/Sadique KHAN was not assessed to be 
significant, it is nevertheless surprising, given the amount of information MI5 and the police had 
on him, that they said they had not identified Mohammed Sidique KHAN prior to 7/7. We 
questioned MI5 in detail on this point.’ 
 
My notes for a telephone conversation with the MI5 link man on the 14
th
 July show I asked him 
about the ‘clean skins’ question. He did not say they were ‘clean skins’ but said that ‘they were 
not on our radar’ and one of the bombers was indirectly linked to Operation Crevice. This 
supports the ISC investigation statement. (In later conversations with the MI5 link man they start 
to amend their position saying that more evidence of prior knowledge had come to light.) The 
impression was of a fast moving and slightly chaotic situation. Later they were clearly 
embarrassed. It is likely the ‘clean skins’ quoted came from a senior police officer from the anti 
terrorist branch acting outside the police press office rubric, a not uncommon occurrence at the 
time. What we can see here are the perils for the intelligence agencies of being an official, 
formal, but non-attributable. The requirement on the media not to use precise attribution caused 
confusion for all involved and problems for MI5 that needed to be resolved by an inquiry. This 
could have been resolved by a more open system of attribution.  It is hard for the reader to know 
what ‘security sources’ or ‘Whitehall sources’ actually are and this can be confused with other 
agencies including the police in their anti-terrorism role.  
 
A continuing relationship 
 
MI5 have sought to retain a good relationship with the media.  This paper has discussed the 
functioning of the accredited reporter system but from the media’s perspective. It is not easy to 
know what MI5 have made of it. MI5 press officers have occasionally fumed at what they 
perceived as inaccurate reporter or unjustified criticism. The only formal comment has come 
from The Director General of MI5, Jonathan Evans said, in an address to the media in 2007 said: 
‘I am, on the whole, impressed with the media's sense of responsibility and its understanding of 
our concerns. And as the demand for news increases, we cannot afford to let this understanding 
fall away, because there is no contract between the security and intelligence agencies and the 
media. There is no memorandum of understanding between us. It is a matter of trust.’ (Evans, 
2007)  In 2004 Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee briefly examined the 
relationships between the agencies and press. It took evidence and concluded: (ISC, 2004-5. pp 
31-32) 
 
 Most of the witnesses from the media were content with the current mechanisms for 
contacting the Agencies. They commented that the Security Service was perhaps the 
easiest Agency to deal with, which they attributed to the Service’s public protection role 
and need to communicate with the public at large, and that the SIS was the most difficult. 
……. A further complication is that the public now questions the Agencies’ ability to 
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produce accurate intelligence, which puts pressure on the Agencies to show how and 
when their intelligence was accurate and useful. 
 
The Government is trying to balance the need to inform people about issues that affect 
them, such as the terrorist threat to the UK, whilst still protecting the Agencies’ work. 
This is a difficult balance, which requires further thought. 
At the time of writing the system is still in place as described. I spoke to several reporters who 
are accredited. MI6 have moved from using a senior officer to recruiting a professional 
government information officer with previous experience in the Cabinet Office and Police. The 
heads of MI6 and MI5 lunch with editors and accredited journalists from major news 
organisations. One participant in these lunches observed that the information flow from the 
agencies tends to be more interesting and candid the higher the source is placed within the 
agency. The non-attribution rules still apply. Unusually, possibly unprecedented, MI6 was so 
heavily criticized, not least from the coroner, over the death of one of its officers, Gareth 
Williams, that stung into giving a statement to the Press Association defending its position and 
attributed to an 'SIS spokesman'. Examining academic analysis of crime reporting one is struck 
by other similarities. The intelligence agencies seem to be hesitantly following the police path of 
professionalization of media contacts and moving away from press contacts chosen from serving 
officers. As Schlesinger and Tumber have shown media contact can evolve moves from 
‘defensive and secretive’ answering reporter’s questions to managing information flow and 
image reconstruction (1994, 107-111)  
Conclusion 
 
As revealed in the examples above some journalists have rushed to judgment either prematurely, 
on the basis of personal embarrassment and with inaccurate information. Over my career I had 
been highly critical of the intelligence services over specific issues and the broader lack of 
accountability. It would be very easy to accuse them of seeking to use the institutional links with 
the news media to sow unattributed disinformation but the situation is more nuanced.  There is 
compelling evidence MI6 was politicized at a senior level in after 9/11 and did proffer 
information as credible that in fact was poorly evidenced. The whole issue over the source 
known as Curveball was a nadir for the western intelligence community (Drogin 2007). Even the 
sceptic could be swayed by the certainty that emanated from MI6 about the existence of WMD 
and of Saddam Hussein’s imminent aggression. If the UK media were too willing to publish the 
government’s claims of WMD, eventually the media returned to their fourth estate role. 
 
The evidence detailed above suggests MI5’s record is better and the Security Service briefers did 
not deliberately lie over Khan. Early briefings did not accurately portray how frequently leader 
of the 7/7 bombers had come up on MI5’s ‘radar’. Perhaps they were suffering from the ‘fog of 
war’; working on the best information available, while still analyzing and collating evidence. 
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There is no evidence MI5 was politicised. My own non-official and proven inside sources of the 
time deny that MI5 became captive, like MI6, to the Downing Street’s political agendas. The 
formal relationship between intelligence and news media remains difficult. In a couple of 
decades we have moved from a situation where the intelligence services used to say nothing or 
would only leak to their advantage, to a situation where they tried to respond to journalists in a 
fast changing situations. It is a very different problem. If the news media want fast moving 
operational information that later is proved not to be accurate journalist need to think carefully 
before accusing agencies of lying. David Leigh, investigations editor of The Guardian, has 
commented on the fraught relationship between agencies and journalists. As journalists, he says, 
“Our first task as practitioners is to document what goes on in this very furtive field. Our second 
task ought to be to hold an open debate on what the proper relations between the intelligence 
agencies and the media ought to be. And our final task must then be to find ways of actually 
behaving more sensibly. (Leigh, 2000) 
 
This paper attempts to begin a framework for analyzing the institutional links between 
intelligence and the news media building on Hall et al work. We can see useful parameters in the 
unofficial/official axis and also the consequences of non-attribution.  
  
As for the question: Does this system act in the public interest? The current system has 
eliminated much of the nonsense attributed to the intelligence services in the past. Generally, but 
not always, it seems to put accurate information into the public domain. The following points 
emerge: 
 The jury is still out on whether the news media can trust the intelligence service briefings 
as problems have emerged in times of maximum stress.  
 Overall the links have improved the accuracy of intelligence related information into the 
public domain. 
 In the time of 24/7 rolling news it has a new set of problems that are hard to resolve 
professionally. Can journalists really have it both ways with an immediate response to 
any crisis and a guarantee that response has copper bottomed accuracy? The media 
cannot always do that, why should the intelligence agencies?  
 The non-attributable sourcing is confusing and needs to be changed to direct attribution 
to the source.  
 It may now be time for the agencies to have proper press offices so that they can be seen 
to be transparent and participants in 21
st
 century democracy.  
 It is now harder to develop informal, independent voices from within the intelligence 
agencies. In the past these voices have acted as important sources top rectify lack of 
transparency and accountability. 
 It is possible for the news media to maintain its fourth estate role while maintaining links 
to the intelligence agencies but great care has to be taken to retain journalistic credibility 
in this unique relationship. 
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